Governance often occurs more indirectly than directly. Governors make use of so-called intermediaries (or agents) in order to reach the targets of their policies. In doing so, they seek intermediaries that are both competent and controllable. However, the competence of intermediaries on the one hand makes them difficult to control, while, on the other hand, attempts to control intermediaries often undermine their competence. This project examines how governance in international institutions continuously changes in light of this “Governor’s Dilemma.” Particular attention is given to orchestration and co-optation as two specific modes of indirect governance.
Publications
- Abbott, K. W., Genschel, P., Snidal, D., & Zangl, B. (2021). Competence versus control: The governor’s dilemma. In The Spectrum of International Institutions (pp. 233-255). Routledge.
- Abbott, K. W., Genschel, P., Snidal, D., & Zangl, B. (2021). Beyond opportunism: Intermediary loyalty in regulation and governance. Regulation & Governance, 15, S83-S101.
- Abbott, K. W., Zangl, B., Snidal, D., & Genschel, P. (Eds.). (2020). The governor's dilemma: indirect governance beyond principals and agents. Oxford University Press.
- Abbott, K. W., Genschel, P., Snidal, D., & Zangl, B. (2016). Two logics of indirect governance: Delegation and orchestration. British Journal of Political Science, 46(4), 719-729.